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Abstract 
  We show that monopoly is better than competition in term of social welfare for low 
frequency routes. Competition affects both flight schedules and airfares. Flight 
schedules get un-even interval by competition and this leads to large scheduling delay 
cost (SDC). The increment of SDC is large when the number of flights is small. For low 
frequency routes, the increment of SDC by competition overwhelms the decreasing in 
the airfare, so monopoly is better than competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Deregulation in aviation industry is intended to promote competition through new 
entries, which is expected to lower airfares and thereby raise the social welfare. In 
Japan, deregulation removed restrictions on entry, and four airlines started to flight 
services in 1996 and 1997. In the US, Department of Justice rejected American Airlines 
to merge US airway at first. 
However, competition affects not only airfares but also flight schedules. Table 1 shows 
time tables for a monopolistic route (Tokyo-Toyama) and a competitive route 
(Tokyo-Kushiro). As can be seen in this table, flights depart at almost same intervals in 
the former route. In contrast, in the latter, departure times of two airlines (ANA and 
JAL) tend to be close to each other. This might be due to competition of Hotelling type to 
attract passengers whose desired departure times are distributed on the time axis. In 
this case, total scheduling delay cost (hereafter, SDC) in competitive routes would be 
higher than that in monopolistic ones. If this effect is significant, promoting entries may 
result in efficiency loss. In our paper, we focus on the scheduling effect of competition. 
Some positive aspects of monopoly have been pointed out. Bruckner and Spiller [1991] 
introduced the economy of density. The higher traffic density allows the use of larger, 
more efficient aircrafts and this effect leads to lower cost per passenger-mile on dense 
route. Bruckner [2002] and Silva and Verhoef [2013] showed that airlines which have 
large share at their hub airports internalize congestion. Mayer and Sinai [2003] and 
Santos and Robin [2010] empirically showed that flight delays are lower at highly 
concentrated airports because the airline internalizes congestion. 
Previous researches ignored flight schedules and SDC was given directly while SDC 
is linked with scheduling strongly. Brueckner [2004], Kawasaki [2012], Alderighi, Cento, 
Nijkamp and Rietveld [2005] and Flores-Fillol [2009] treated flight frequency as one of 
components of generalized cost. (GC = airgare + 1 frequency⁄ ) These models implicitly 
assume that all flights are at even interval and SDC is the inverse of frequency. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the condition where monopoly is better than 
competition and contribute to establishment of anti-trust policies. Competition has two 
effects, that is, price effect and scheduling effect. The former effect increases demand 
and improve social welfare, which is shown as the left path in Figure 1. It has been 
pointed out traditionally and is the basis of anti-trust policies. The latter effect raises 
SDC and decreases demand, and then harms social welfare. It depends on the trade-off 
between the effects which monopoly or competition is better in term of social welfare.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the empirical part in which we verify 
that competition changes flight schedules and raise SDC by introducing un-evenness 
index. In section 3, we estimate the decrement of airfares by competition and the 
demand function to justify the theoretical model. Section 4 is the theoretical part. We 
establish the model based on empirical regressions to derive the condition where 
monopoly is more desirable than competition. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
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2. Flight schedules and scheduling delay cost 
In this section, we show empirical methodology to provide an evidence that flight 
schedules of monopolistic routes are at more even interval than competitive routes. 
First, to measure scheduling delay, we construct new variables based on intervals of air 
schedule and we define the metric which captures “un-evenness’’ of the air schedule 
using the variables. Second, we present the research design which connects schedule 
distortion and competition. Then, we discuss the data for empirical analysis. Finally, we 
derive the fact which supports our hypothesis aforementioned by the simple regression 
model. 
 
2.1. Scheduling Delay and Un-evenness index 
Scheduling delay (hereafter, SD) is defined as the time difference between the desired 
departing time and actual flight schedule. We assume that all airports are operated 
from 6:00 through 21:00, that is, total business time of each airport is up to 900 minutes. 
This assumption is quite natural because most airports can be operated in this time 
range due to agreements with local residents or aviation policies. It is also note we could 
construct a circler timeframe by connecting 6:00 and 21:00. This implies that, for each 
route, departing times are arranged along the circle’s perimeter with 900 minutes. Then 
we denote actual intervals between flights as  {𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑗  ; 𝑗 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑓} , where 𝑓  is its 
frequency. In addition, passengers’ desired departure time is assumed to be continuous 
uniformly distribution across the perimeter. It is sure that, in actual, the size of 
demands is larger over some periods of time, thus we take account of the fluctuation to 
check robustness.1 Figure 2 shows an example of intervals and passengers’ desirable 
time (described as dashed line) for a route with three services. Then, we define SD for 
each service as a triangle-shaped time whose base is equal to each interval. The height 
of its edge captures the time difference between the flight schedule and desired 
departing time for the focal passenger. 
                                                   
1 See Appendix for this discussion. 
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Then, for a given route, we calculate the average of SD, which is equal to the average 
height of all triangles: 
𝑆𝐷𝑖 =  
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑗
2 𝑓𝑗=1
4 ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑓
𝑗=1
  =  
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑗
2 𝑓𝑗=1
3600
     
where 𝑖 denotes route. This metric is minimized when actual departing times are set at 
regular intervals, which we define minimum SD as follows: 
𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  
900
4𝑓
=  
225
𝑓
 
 
It is note that, by definition, 𝑆𝐷𝑖 increases as the time schedule becomes uneven.  
 
Together these SD metrics, we could construct the new measure which represents 
how the time schedule is distorted relative to the minimized case, that is, 
“unevenness”. The most fundamental methodology is calculating how many times 
the actual SD value is larger than minimum SD value. Thus, for a given route, we 
define the SD metric divided by its minimum value as the unevenness index: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 ≡
𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛                                                                      (1) 
 
It is straightforward that this index is more than or equal to one for all routes, 
particularly as the degree of the distortion of flight schedule relative to optimal 
scheduling becomes larger, reflecting it, the index becomes larger. Since this index could 
capture the scheduling distortion by the standardized way for all routes, we employ it as 
a basis for analysis. 
 
2.2. Un-evenness and Competition 
To clarify the rigorous relationship between calculated unevenness index and 
competition among airlines, we introduce the simple regression model. To identify the 
competition and monopoly, we construct the dummy variable 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖, which is 
equal to one in the case with competition (i.e., more than or equal to two airlines) and 
zero otherwise. Then, we regress the unevenness index on the dummy variable: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1 × 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖                                                   (2) 
 
where 𝜀𝑖 is an error term. If the competition leads to increase in scheduling distortion, 
coefficient 𝛼1 must be positive. Negative estimate indicates the opposite. It should be 
considered that whether or not unevenness index depends on only competitive status. 
However, the airline schedule is rarely affected by other factors including the capacity of 
airplanes or the distance. We also could define the number of airlines as the explanatory 
variable instead of dummy variable, but all results remains to be unchanged. Therefore 
this simple reduced formulation could capture the causal effect of competition on 
unevenness of air scheduling. 
 
2.3. Data 
We briefly describe the data. We focus on all Japanese domestic routes with two or 
more flights in a day and 50,000 or more passengers per year. 85 routes2 meet these 
conditions. We use the timetables published on September 1 in 2011 to calculate 
scheduling delays. 
 
2.4. Results 
Using the data, we could take a first look on the relationship between distorted air 
scheduling and competition. For example, the un-evenness index is 1.12 in 
Tokyo-Toyama route which is monopolistic route, while the value of competitive 
Tokyo-Kushiro route is 1.22. (See table 1 for the timetables of these routes.) To check our 
hypothesis the competition leads to un-even schedule, we estimate the regression model 
above and derive the main result: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒?̂?𝑖 = 0.436 × 𝑰(Number of Airlines ≥ 2) +  1.121 
           (9.25)                             (32.28) 
                                                   
2 In order to focus on urban area rather than airports themselves, we integrate multi airports in same region. 
While there are alternative definitions, we consider urban employment area in Japan in 2005 defined by Kanemoto 
(2005). For instance, Kansai international airport, Itami (Osaka) airport, and Kobe airport are all in the Osaka 
area in terms of urban employment based data. Thus, we combine these airport and routes arriving and departing 
at these airports are regarded as a single route. Other areas are Tokyo area (including Narita airport and Haneda 
airport), Nagoya area (including Chubu international airport and Nagoya airport), Sapporo area (including Chitose 
airport and Sapporo Tamaoka airport), and Fukuoka area (including Fukuoka airport and Kita-Kyusyu airport).  
 
 where 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒?̂?𝑖 is estimator of unevenness index and I is an indicator function. The 
numbers in a parenthesis show t value of coefficients. Strongly positive value and 
significance of the coefficient for competition imply that monopoly leads to more 
equalized schedules, while competition deteriorates them. This finding underpins our 
hypothesis. We conclude with the derived fact: 
 
Fact 
If competition status changes from monopoly to competition, the unevenness of air 
schedule becomes larger. 
 
3. Preparation 
This section provides empirical analysis on air demand and airfare. While plenty of 
previous literatures analyze the determinants of them, we still need parameters needed 
for theoretical analysis in the later section. Particularly, we focus on the relationship 
between competition and airfare. We first provide the data and the research design for 
it, the model of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, then estimate it using 
Japanese data. 
 
3.1. Regression model 
For air demand, we estimate the following linear regression: 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                     (3) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the relative demand size, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is generalized cost calculated 
for each route and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the distance of each route. 𝜖𝑖 is error term. For our 
purpose, coefficient 𝛽1 captures how scheduling delay has impact on the air demand.  
For airfare, we estimate the following linear equation: 
 
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾0 +  𝛾1 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                     (4) 
 
where 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖  is cut-rate airfare discussed above and 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  is the same 
variable in section 2. 𝑢𝑖 is error term. In addition, we add 𝑁𝑒𝑤_ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 which is 
equal to one if the focal route is operated only by new airlines and zero otherwise. 
Because, in Japan, newly companies set the airfare lower than existing companies to 
attract more passengers, we control the effect. Among the coefficients,  𝛾1 captures how 
competition directly affects airfare. By definition, note that distance directly affect 
demand and indirectly affect through generalized cost. Therefore we have to consider 
multicollinearity problem. However, except for perfect multicollinearity, estimators 
satisfy consistency and efficiency. In fact, correlation between distance and fare is 
strictly lower than one, thus OLS estimator is BLUE. For our purpose, we emphasize 
the preferable feature of estimator to avoid the misspecification problem.  
 
3.2. Data 
Most data for airfares and demand is cross section data in 2010 obtained from Survey 
of services conducted by specified Japanese air carrier, Survey of services conducted by 
Japanese air carrier other than specified Japanese air carrier, and Airline origin and 
destination survey conducted by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism (MLIT).  
We here define some variables for OLS estimation. First, population in each urban 
employment area (i.e., potential demand) is computed as the summation of population 
in each municipality constructing it. Given them, actual relative flight demand size for 
each route is defined by the actual number of passengers divided by population of urban 
employment areas linked by the route. This enables us to adjust demand size in terms 
of potential demand size. On the other hand, for each route, we calculate its airfare by 
averaging reported airfare taking account of discount. In fact, most passengers pay 
cut-rate price; for example, if a passenger reserve a seat 2 weeks advanced, she pay 
discounted price. To do this, we compute the average airfare with weighting the number 
of passengers who pay the discounted price. Thus we define the cut-rate airfare as an 
explained variable instead of a regular price. For other explanatory variables, distance 
is the cruising distance reported in the survey and its unit is kilometer. Generalized cost 
is calculated following previous studies. Generalized cost is defined as summation of 
airfare and scheduling delay cost. We compute the scheduling delay cost by multiplying 
scheduling delay 𝑆𝐷𝑖 by value of scheduling delay, which is equal to 10.9 Yen per 
minute in line with Tseng, Ubbels and Verhoef [2005]. 
 
3.3. Results 
Table 2 shows the results of regression presented above. All coefficients are strongly 
significant. It is apparently showed that air demand decreases when generalized cost 
increases. This implies that scheduling delay cost has negative (indirect) impact on 
demand. For airfare, competition between multiple airlines sufficiently decreases its 
airfare. Combining these results and fact in section 2 could support our main idea that 
competition has negative impact on demand through distortion of time schedule, on the 
other hand, it decreases airfare, which leads to positive effect on demand.  
Also note that other results including the impacts of distance and newly airline are 
quite natural and in line with previous literatures. 
In the next section, based on the empirical results, we provide theoretical explanation 
for our idea.   
<Table 2: About Here> 
 
4. Theoretical Analysis 
  In this section, we analyze how competition affect the social welfare based on the 
results of the empirical part. We clarify the condition in which monopoly is better than 
competition in terms of the social welfare. At first, we introduce the model which 
represents the effect of competition on the SDC and the airfare. 
 
4.1. Model 
  As shown in (1), the average scheduling delay is calculated as 
𝑠 = 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑘𝑓−1𝑖.                      (5) 
𝑘 is a positive constant and 𝑓 represents the frequency. Based on regression (2), we 
formulate un-evenness index as 
𝑖𝑚 = 𝑎0                               (6.1) 
𝑖𝑐 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1                                     (6.2) 
∆𝑖 = 𝑎1                             (6.3) 
The subscripts m and c stand for monopoly and competition, respectively. ∆ indicates 
the difference between competition and monopoly. 𝑎0 and 𝑎1 are corresponding to α0 
and α1 in the regression equation (2) respectively. (6.3) indicates that competition leads 
to more un-even schedule by 𝑎1. Using equations (6) on un-evenness of the schedule, we 
rewrite scheduling delay as 
𝑠𝑚 = 𝑎0𝑘𝑓
−1                         (7.1) 
𝑠𝑐 = (𝑎0 + 𝑎1)𝑘𝑓
−1                        (7.2) 
∆𝑠 = 𝑎1𝑘𝑓
−1.                           (7.3) 
  We formulate the airfare as 
𝑝𝑚 = 𝑏𝑜                              (8.1) 
𝑝𝑐 = 𝑏𝑜 − 𝑏1                        (8.2) 
∆𝑝 = −𝑏1                          (8.3) 
𝑏𝑜  and 𝑏1  are corresponding to β0 + β2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + β3𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  and −β1  in 
regression equation (3) respectively. (8.3) indicates that competition leads to lower 
airfare by 𝑏1. 
We assume the linear demand function as 
𝑥 = 𝑐0 − 𝑐1𝑝 − 𝑐2𝑠.                         (9) 
Here, the generalized cost is 𝑝 + 𝑐2 𝑐1⁄ ･𝑠 and 𝑐2 𝑐1⁄  is value of scheduling delay3. 𝑐0 
and 𝑐1  are corresponding to 𝛾0 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  and −𝛾1  in equation (4) respectively. 
Using equations (8) and (9), we obtain the demand functions for monopolistic and 
competitive cases. 
𝑥𝑚 = 𝑐0 − 𝑏𝑜𝑐1 − 𝑎0𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1                  (10.1) 
𝑥𝑐 = 𝑐0 − (𝑏𝑜 − 𝑏1)𝑐1 − (𝑎0 + 𝑎1)𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1            (10.2) 
∆𝑥 = 𝑏1𝑐1 − 𝑎1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1                   (10.3) 
The first term in (10.3) is the decrement of the airfare and the second term is the 
increment of SD by competition. 
  We assume three assumptions as following. 
 
Assumption 1: 
The airfare in monopolistic case is higher than the increment of SDC. 
𝑏0 > 𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1 ⇔ 𝑝𝑚 > 𝑐2 𝑐1⁄ ･∆𝑠 
𝑝𝑚 = 28,402 and 𝑐2 𝑐1⁄ ･∆𝑠 = 214 when 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1,000, 𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 0 and 𝑓 = 5. 
Therefore, this assumption is acceptable.  
 
Assumption 2: 
In monopolistic case, the demand is positive even if SDC gets double. 
𝑐0 − 𝑏0𝑐1 − 2𝑎0𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1 > 0 ⇔ 𝑥𝑚 > 𝑐2𝑠
𝑚 
𝑥𝑚 = 0.0373 and 𝑐2𝑠
𝑚 = 0.0037 when 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1,000, 𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 0 and 𝑓 = 5. 
Therefore, this assumption is acceptable. 
 
Assumption 3: 
We set the lower bound of 𝑓 as  
𝑓 ≡ 𝑐0
−1𝑐2(2𝑎0 + 𝑎1)𝑘 
𝑓 = 0.1908 when 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1,000 and 𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 0. Frequency should be two or 
larger so that competition can occur. Therefore, this assumption is acceptable. 
 
4.2. Discussion 
 In this subsection, we analyze the effects of competition on the demand and the social 
                                                   
3 According to Tseng, Ubbels and Verhoef [2005], Value of Scheduling Delay is 4.6566€
/hour. We convert it to Yen by 1€ = 140¥ and obtain 𝑐2 𝑐1⁄  is 10.9 Yen per minute. 
welfare focusing on the frequency. Differentiating (7.3) with respect to 𝑓, we obtain 
Lemma 1 
 
Lemma 1 
 As the flight service becomes frequent, the increment in SD by competition becomes 
small. 
𝜕∆𝑠
𝜕𝑓
= −𝑑1𝑘𝑓
−2 < 0 
Flight intervals are short for high frequency route, therefore the increment in SD is 
small while the flight schedule gets un-even by competition.  
We differentiate (10.3) with respect to 𝑓 and obtain Lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2 
As the flight service becomes frequent, the increment in demand becomes large. 
𝜕∆𝑥
𝜕𝑓
= 𝑎1
−1𝑎2𝑑1𝑘𝑓
−2 > 0 
  The first term in the right hand side of Eq. (10.3) is the decrement of the airfare and 
the second term is the increment of SDC. The former independents of frequency while 
the latter is decreasing function of frequency. Therefore, the change in the generalized 
cost by competition also decreases in frequency. 
  We analyze the social welfare. We define the welfare as the social benefit minus social 
cost. The former is consumers’ benefit from their flights and it is depicted as the lower 
part of the invers demand function. The latter is SDC which is taken by consumers and 
we ignore the operating cost of airlines.  
We define two effects of competition, namely, “demand effect” and “SD effect”. 
“Demand effect” is the improvement of the social welfare by the increase in demand due 
to the decreasing in the airfare by competition. This effect is shown as the square BEFG 
in Figure 3 and ∆𝑆𝑊𝐷 ≡
1
2
(𝐺𝐶𝑚 + 𝐺𝐶𝑐 − 2𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑠
𝑐) ∆𝑥. “SD effect” is the decrement of the 
social welfare by the increase in SDC. This effect is depicted as the square ABCD and 
∆𝑆𝑊𝑆 ≡ 𝑐1
−1𝑐2∆𝑠･𝑥.  
 The change in the social welfare is ∆𝑆𝑊 ≡ ∆𝑆𝑊𝐷 − ∆𝑆𝑊𝑆  and it depends on the 
trade-off between two effects which monopoly or competition is better in term of the 
social welfare. 
 
<Figure 3: About Here> 
 
We calculate the values of both effects by using equations (7), (8) and (10). 
∆𝑆𝑊𝐷 =
1
2
{2𝑏0 − 𝑏1 − 𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1}(𝑏1𝑐1 − 𝑎1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1)                     (11.1) 
∆𝑆𝑊𝑆 = 𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1(𝑐0 − 𝑏0𝑐1 − 𝑎0𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1)                                         (11.2) 
We differentiate (11)s with respect to 𝑓 and obtain Lemma 3. 
 
Lemma 3-1 
 As the flight service becomes frequent, the improvement in social welfare by demand 
effect is large. 
 
Proof: 
𝜕∆𝑆𝑊𝐷
𝜕𝑓
= 𝑎1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−2(𝑏0 − 𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1) 
According to assumption 1, 𝑏0 − 𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1 > 0 and then 𝜕∆𝑆𝑊𝐷 𝜕𝑓⁄ > 0. 
(Q.E.D.) 
As shown in Lemma 2, the increment of demand is large for routes with high 
frequency, so demand effect is large when the number of flights is large. 
 
Lemma 3-2 
As the flight service becomes frequent, welfare loss by SD effect becomes small. 
 
Proof: 
𝜕∆𝑆𝑊𝑆
𝜕𝑓
= −𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−2(𝑐0 − 𝑏0𝑐1 − 2𝑎0𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1) 
According to assumption 2, 𝑐0 − 𝑏0𝑐1 − 2𝑎0𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1 > 0. Therefore, 𝜕∆𝑆𝑊𝑆 𝜕𝑓⁄ < 0. 
 (Q.E.D.) 
 
 As shown in Lemma 1, the increment of SDC is small for route with high 
frequency, SD effect is small when the number of flight is large. 
  Finally, we analyze the relationship between the total effect and frequency. Using 
(11), we rewrite the total effect as 
∆𝑆𝑊 = ∆𝑆𝑊𝐷 − ∆𝑆𝑊𝑆 
=
1
2
(2𝑎0 + 𝑎1)𝑎1𝑐1
−1𝑐2
2𝑘2𝑓−2 − 𝑎1𝑐0𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−1 + 𝐴, 
where, 𝐴 ≡
1
2
(2𝑏0 − 𝑏1)𝑏1𝑐1 =
1
2
(𝑝𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐)𝑏1𝑐1 > 0. 
 
Lemma 4 
 As the flight service becomes frequent, change in social welfare by competition is 
large. 
 
Proof: 
𝜕∆𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑓
= 𝑎1𝑐0𝑐1
−1𝑐2𝑘𝑓
−3{𝑓 − (2𝑎0 + 𝑎1)𝑐0
−1𝑐2𝑘} 
According to assumption 3, 𝑓 > 𝑓 = (2𝑎0 + 𝑎1)𝑐0
−1𝑐2𝑘. Therefore, 𝜕∆𝑆𝑊 𝜕𝑓⁄ > 0. 
(Q.E.D.) 
 
Lemma 4 indicates ∆𝑆𝑊(𝑓) is decreasing in the area 𝑓 > 𝑓 as depicted in Figure 4. 
∆𝑆𝑊(𝑓) is minimum at 𝑓 = 𝑓 and maximum value is A when 𝑓 → ∞. We summarize 
results and obtain  
(i) When ∆𝑆𝑊 (𝑓) < 0, the solution 𝑓∗ exists and 
∆𝑆𝑊 < 0    𝑖𝑓   𝑓 < 𝑓 < 𝑓∗,  
∆𝑆𝑊 > 0    𝑖𝑓    𝑓∗ < 𝑓. 
(ii) When ∆𝑆𝑊 (𝑓) > 0, 
∆𝑆𝑊 > 0      for all    𝑓 > 𝑓 
  
<Figure 4: About Here> 
 
From the form of ∆𝑆𝑊 (𝑓), we obtain 
Proposition 
 When ∆𝑆𝑊 (𝑓) < 0 and 𝑓 < 𝑓 < 𝑓∗, monopoly is better than competition in terms of the 
social welfare. 
 
For low frequency routes, SD increases largely by competition as shown in Lemma 1 
and demand increases only a little or decreases as shown in Lemma 2. Therefore, 
monopoly is better than competition for low frequency routes. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  The present analysis shows that competition leads to un-even flight schedule. This 
result holds if we set demand peak times and the un-evenness index independents from 
flight frequency. In theoretical part, we show that monopoly is better than competition 
for routes with low frequency. SD effect is large when the number of flights is small 
because SDC for low frequency routes is large even in monopolistic case. On the other 
hand, the demand effect independents of flight frequency. Therefore, the SD effect 
overwhelms the demand effect for low frequency routes. 
  We have two tasks for the future. First, we should consider airline networks. 
Hub-Spoke networks are adopted by airlines, and then many passengers make transit 
at the hub. Second, other major topics such as congestion should be taken into account.  
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 Table 1: Flight schedules for monopolistic and competitive routes 
  
Dep. Time Airline Dep. Time Airline
6：40 ANA 7：40 ANA
9：45 ANA 8：10 JAL
13：40 ANA 11：20 ANA
15：35 ANA 12：30 JAL
18：25 ANA 17：00 ANA
19：50 ANA 17：50 JAL
Tokyo-Toyama Tokyo-Kushiro
Each entry reports 
OLS estimator  
  Demand size Airfare 
Generalized Cost 
 
- 0.00000683 
 
  
(-4.19) 
 
Distance 
 
0.000143 15.645 
  
(5.06) (18.77) 
Multi Dummy 
  
-1724.10 
   
(-3.40) 
New Dummy 
  
-8240.49 
   
(-5.22) 
    
Constant 
 
0.0926 12757.57 
  
(3.83) (19.41) 
Adjusted 𝑅2 
 
0.2203 0.8188 
Observations 
 
85 85 
    
Table 2: Estimation of demand size and airfare 
  
  Figure 1: Effect paths of competition to social welfare 
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SD 
Time 
𝐼𝑛𝑡1 𝐼𝑛𝑡3 𝐼𝑛𝑡2 
 Figure 3: “Demand effect” and “SD effect” 
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 Figure 4: Change in the social welfare and frequency 
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